Political short-termism obtains when a politician provides a public good that gives an immediate payo¤ while it would be optimal for the society that he provided a public good that gives a payo¤ only in the future.
Introduction
The word political short-termism generally denotes a situation in which politicians invest in short-term public goods while it would be optimal for the society that they invested in long-term public goods. Global warming, politicians'reluctance to undertake structural reforms, chronic underinvestment in infrastructures, are only some of the phenomena that economists and political scientists ascribe to political short-termism.
But what does cause political short-termism? To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the nature of the politician-citizens relationship. From a purely theoretic point of view, any decision might be made by the citizens themselves. As a matter of fact, however, the citizens generally delegate authority to politicians. One reason for doing so is that politicians are usually expected to do a better job (Maskin and Tirole, 2004) . The politician-citizens relationship is indeed generally characterized by asymmetric information: politicians enjoy an informational advantage over the average citizen 1 . The existence of a potential con ‡ict of interests between politicians and citizens may however give rise to an incentive problem. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism to solve (or at least alleviate) such a problem 2 . According to the traditional literature, elections may have two positive e¤ects: a disciplining e¤ect (the ability of elections to induce politicians to act in the public interest) and a selection e¤ect (the possibility for the society to replace the incumbent politician with a better politician). Recent studies, however, have shown that reelection concern can also induce well-motivated politicians to act against public interest (see for example, Coate and Morris, 1995) When politicians act against the public interest, as in the case of political shorttermism, two not mutually exclusive explanations may be given for this phenomenon: it may be due to the existence of a con ‡ict of interest that elections are unable to solve or it may be caused by elections.
A …rst explanation for political short-termism is therefore that politicians, for some reason, prefer to invest in short-term public goods. Gersbach (2004) , for example, proposes a model in which politicians have a bias towards short-term public goods because they are impatient (i.e., they care less about future utility than current utility). He shows that if politician's discount factor is below a threshold, the public cannot motivate him to undertake long-term projects by election alone.
A second possible explanation is that politicians invest more in short-term public goods because, so by doing, they expect to improve their reelection chances. This is, for example, the idea underlying the political business cycle theory (Nordhaus 1975) . Summarizing this argument, Rogo¤ (1990) writes:
During election years, governments at all levels often engage in a consumption binge in which taxes are cut, transfers are raised, and government spending is distorted toward projects with high immediate visibility. ... Any incumbent politician, regardless of his ideological stripes, wants to convince voters that he is doing an e¢ cient job running the government. The deeper question is why rational voters might allow their expectations about postelection performance to be in ‡uenced by preelection budget antics. (p. 21)
The main purpose of this paper is to show that when some intrinsic di¤erences between short-term and long-term public goods are considered and politicians di¤er in their motivation for holding o¢ ce, reelection concern may give rise to political short-termism in a world in which voters are rational.
We develop a simple two-period political agency model in which, in each period, the society has to choose whether to invest a given amount of money in a shortterm (or visible) public good or in a long-term (or invisible) public good. The visible public good gives a certain immediate payo¤, while the invisible public good gives an uncertain payo¤ only in the second period. The society has imperfect information about its optimal policy: it knows the payo¤ of the visible public good, while it does not know for certainty the payo¤ of the invisible public good. Policy uncertainty re ‡ects the di¢ culty for the electorate to correctly anticipate the consequences of long-term public goods.
The society may delegate the decisions to a politician who is better informed about its optimal policy. We assume that politicians di¤er in their motivations for holding o¢ ce. There are two types of politicians: a congruent politician, who has the same preferences as the society, and a non-congruent politician, who is only interested in rents and considers public goods simply as devices necessary for him to extract rents. Politicians earn, moreover, an exogenous ego-rent from holding o¢ ce, as in Rogo¤ (1990) . Politician's type is private information.
The society observes what policy was implemented and its payo¤. As in Aidt and Dutta (2007) , we assume that it cannot observe the amount of money politicians invest in public goods directly, so it can only try to deduce whether they diverted resources from the payo¤ it obtained. This assumption implies the existence for a non-congruent politician of an endogenous bias towards the invisible public good. The intuition is straightforward. If a non-congruent politician extracts rents by investing in the visible public good, his type will be revealed to the society, so he will be voted out of o¢ ce, while if he extracts rents by investing in the invisible public good, he might be reelected (the negative e¤ects of rent extraction will be observed only after the election). Hence, the invisible public good is a better device to divert resources than the visible one.
Because of the above distortion, the investment in the invisible public good is seen by the society as a bad signal of …ttingness of the incumbent politician's preferences with its own. As an obvious consequence, in equilibrium, the society will reelect with a higher probability an incumbent politician who invested in the visible public good without extracting rents rather than an incumbent politician who invested in the invisible public good.
The main results of the paper are the following. We …rstly demonstrate the existence of three perfect Bayesian equilibria in which, in order to increase his probability of being reelected, the congruent politician invests with positive probability in the visible public good while investing in the invisible one would give the society a higher payo¤ in that period: we use the term short-termism to refer to this situation. This occurs when the congruent politician has su¢ ciently strong reelection motives, i.e., a high ego-rent stemming from holding o¢ ce and/or a high probability that a non-congruent politician will be elected in the next period. Moreover, when the congruent politician's ego-rent is su¢ ciently high, the equilibrium characterized by short-termism is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. These results also obtain when a congruent politician does not stem any ego-rent from holding o¢ ce.
We next show a quite surprising result: short-termism can be optimal for the society. When a congruent politician provides the visible public good instead of the invisible one, it is more likely that he will be reelected, so the probability that the o¢ ce will be held in the second period by a congruent politician increases (selection e¤ ect). Moreover, the probability that a politician who invested in the visible public good will be reelected increases. This has a positive e¤ect on the non-congruent politician, who has a stronger incentive to invest in the visible public good without extracting a rent in order to be reelected (disciplining e¤ ect). Each of these two e¤ects can make short-termism optimal for the society when it is su¢ ciently likely that a politician is non-congruent.
Finally, we show that reelection can actually reduce social welfare. The expected gain deriving from both positive disciplining and selection e¤ects may be more than o¤set by the expected loss due to short-termism. This paper is related to the literature on electoral accountability. Barro (1973 ), Ferejohn (1986 and Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) consider models where all politicians are identical, so the voters are indi¤erent between reelecting the incumbent politician and electing a new one. Voters vote retrospectively and the reelection concern has a disciplining e¤ect. Such an e¤ect also arises in our model: a noncongruent politician may choose not to extract rents in order to be reelected. Banks and Sundaram (1993) and Reed (1994) introduce heterogeneity in the politicians' motivation. Reelection concern has also a selection e¤ect: an incumbent politician who is reelected is indeed better than a new politician. When a politician chooses whether to implement a policy, he has to take into account the e¤ect of his behavior on his reputation. If politicians are better informed than the voters, it may occur that a well-motivated politician does not implement the optimal policy for the society because, this would worsen his reputation, and so his probability of being reelected. The possibility that reputational concern gives rise to an undisciplining e¤ect of reelection has already been shown. Coate and Morris (1995) analyze the form of transfers in a model in which voters have imperfect information about both the e¤ects of policies and the motivation of politicians. They show that when such an asymmetry in information is considered, politicians who are interested in making transfers to special interests may use ine¢ cient but reputation-preserving methods of redistribution. Wrasai (2005) proposes a similar model to study the importance of motivational di¤erences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. She shows that reelection concerns may induce a good politician not to implement a socially desirable policy, as well as a bad politician not to undertake a socially undesirable policy. Maskin and Tirole (2004) consider a model where a public o¢ cial has a better information on the optimality of an economic policy than a homogeneous electorate. They show that reelection concern may induce a politician to pander to public opinion, i.e., a politician may choose an action only because it is popular. Our model is similar in spirit to their model. For example, we show that providing the invisible public good can worsen the politician's reputation, and this can induce a politician with the same preferences as the society not to provide it when would be optimal for the society. It is worth noting that our result is not related to pandering: we can indeed have short-termism even when investing in the visible public good is not the popular action. Morris (2001) examines a model in which an informed advisor wishes to convey his valuable information to an uninformed decision maker with identical preferences. He shows that, despite in a one period setting the advisor has the incentive to truthfully reveal his information, if the decision maker thinks that he might be biased in favor of one decision (e.g., to be seen as a racist) and he does not wish to be thought to be biased (to be a racist), no information might be conveyed in equilibrium. As in our model, in both Morris (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) , reputational concern may lead to a loss of socially valuable information.
Finally, this paper is obviously related to the literature on political short-termism. Colombo and Garrì (2007) consider a two-period model with incomplete information where the (socially optimal) project would call for investing in both periods the whole amount of money raised through taxes. They obtain an in…nite number of equilibria, which di¤er in the amount of money the politician invests in the visible public good. The equilibrium that actually obtains crucially depends on the beliefs of the citizens on the behavior of politicians. In our model, politicians enjoy an informational advantage over the citizens, which allows us to analyze when delegation actually dominates direct democracy. Moreover, when politicians are suf…ciently interested in being reelected, the unique equilibrium of the game displays short-termism. In Gersbach (2004) , short-termism arises because the public cannot motivate politicians with a low discount factor to undertake long-term projects by election alone. He suggests a mechanism which combines incentive contracts and elections to overcome this problem. In our setting, short-termism is not due to the politicians'impatience because both politicians and voters are assumed not to discount the future at all. Aidt and Dutta (2007) consider a model where all politicians are identical and voters vote retrospectively. As in our model, they assume that individuals cannot observe the investments in public goods made by the politician directly, but they are able to infer how much it was invested in each good from observed provision levels. They show that short-termism is not an inevitable implication of the fact that voters cannot observe immediately how much politicians divert from investments in longterm public goods, but arises because of complex interations between observation lags, economic growth and revenue constraints. On the contrary, we show that if politicians di¤er in their motivation, the simple fact that long-term public goods are safer device to divert resources than short-term public goods can give rise to short-termism.
Finally, Rogo¤ (1990) considers a model where politicians di¤er in their competence, which is not known to the electorate. Short-termism arises because the incumbent politician has an incentive to shift government expenditures towards easily observed consumption spending, and away from investment, in order to signal his competence. In our model, all politicians have the same competence, but di¤er in their motivation for holding o¢ ce.
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2, we present the model with no reelection concern. In section 3, we present the model with reelection and characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria. In section 4, we show that reelection can reduce social welfare. In section 5, we show that delegation can be optimal for the society. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Mathematical Appendix.
Model without reelection
We consider a two-period model where, in each period, the society has to choose whether to invest a given amount of money in an 'invisible'(I) public good or in a 'visible' (V ) one. The invisible public good gives a payo¤ only in the following period, while the visible public good gives only an immediate payo¤. The visible public good may be thought of as a mere transfer of resources among citizens (reducing taxes, increasing unemployment bene…ts, etc.), while the invisible public good may be thought of as the implementation of a public project (building a bridge, etc.). The society may delegate such a decision to a politician who, in each period, chooses I or V . For each public good provided, the politician also has to choose whether to extract a rent (R) or not (N ). The society cannot observe a politician extracting a rent.
Politicians di¤er in their motivation for holding o¢ ce. We assume that a politician may be of two types, 'congruent'(C) and 'non-congruent'(N). The congruent politician wants to hold o¢ ce in order both to implement the society's optimal policy and to earn an (exogenous) ego-rent E c 0, while the non-congruent politician wants to hold o¢ ce in order both to divert resources and to earn an (exogenous) ego-rent E n 0. The politician's type is private information. The a priori probability that a politician is congruent is p 2 (0; 1). As in Maskin and Tirole (2004) , we introduce a small perturbation of the pool of candidate politicians: a proportion " > 0 of politicians (with " ! 0) are not interested in being reelected (so that in each period choose actions according to their true preferences), a fraction p of whom are congruent, while the remainder 1 p are non-congruent 3 .
The society does not know which policy is best for it in period t: if k t = H it is I, whereas if k t = L it is V . The a priori probability that k t = H is 2 (0; 1). k 1 is stochastically independent of k 2 . The incumbent politician observes the value of k t before deciding which public good to provide.
As in Besley (2006) , there is uncertainty about the utility a non-congruent politician earns from extracting a rent in period t: if r t = h, the utility is high, whereas if r t = l it is low. The a priori probability that r t = h is 2 (0; 1). r 1 is stochastically independent of r 2 . The incumbent politician observes the value of r t before deciding which public good to provide.
The timing of the model with reelection concern is the following:
In the …rst period, 1. Nature (N) chooses the politician's type i 2 fC; Ng. p is the probability that a politician is congruent; 2. N chooses k 1 2 fH; Lg and r 1 2 fh; lg. k 1 = H with probability , and r 1 = h with probability ; 3. after observing his type i, k 1 , and r 1 , the incumbent politician chooses (P 1 ; R 1 ), with P 1 2 fI; V g and R 1 2 fN; Rg. R 1 = R (N ) means that the politician extracts (does not extract) a rent;
4. the society observes P 1 and its payo¤ u 1 .
In the second period, 5. elections take place; 6. N chooses i 2 fC; Ng if a new politician was elected; 7. N chooses k 2 2 fH; Lg and r 2 2 fh; lg;
8. after observing his type i (if new), r 2 and k 2 , the elected politician chooses (P 2 ; R 2 ).
When a politician does not extract a rent, the society's payo¤s are u(I; N ) and u(V; N ) u, according to whether the incumbent politician invested in the invisible or in the visible public good. We assume that the society knows the value u(V; N ) u, while it does not know for sure u(I; N ): it is common knowledge that if Nature N chooses
When a politician extracts a rent, we assume (without lack of generality) that the society's payo¤ is zero (i.e., u(I; R) = u(V; R) = 0). In addition to the ego-rent E n , a non-congruent politician who observed r t and chose (P t ; R t ) obtains a utility of g rt (P t ; R t ) in period t, which does not depend on k t , and is such that g rt (P t ; N ) = 0 for all P t 2 fI; V g and all r t 2 fh; lg (A.1)
Assumption A.1 says that the non-congruent politician always obtains no utility from investing in public goods without extracting a rent. Assumption A.2 says that the utility of the non-congruent politician from extracting a rent does not depend on the particular type of public good in which he invests.
We have a dynamic game with incomplete information. The solution concept we will use is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth PBE).
The following lemma characterizes the optimal strategies in the second period.
Lemma 2.1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in period 2, the non-congruent politician plays indi¤ erently (I; R) or (V; R), whatever the value of r 2 , while the congruent politician plays (V; N ), whatever the value of k 2
In the second period there is no reelection concern, so the politician always plays his one-period short-term dominant strategy: the congruent politician invests in the visible public good (the invisible public good I does not give any payo¤ in the period when it is implemented) and does not extract a rent (he is not interested in rents), while the non-congruent politician extracts a rent (he is only interested in rents).
In the model with no reelection concern, the politician stays in o¢ ce for two periods. In the …rst period, the congruent politician maximizes social welfare (he invests in the optimal public good for both the society and himself, and does not extract a rent), while the non-congruent politician extracts a rent.
The following proposition characterizes the unique PBE.
Proposition 2.1 In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model with no reelection concern, the non-congruent politician chooses in each period either (I; R) or (V; R) for any r t and any k t , t = 1; 2, while the congruent politician chooses in period 1 (I; N ) if k 1 = H and (V; N ) if k 1 = L, while in period 2 he chooses (V; N ) for any k 2 . The expected utility for the society is EU
Model with reelection
In the model with reelection concern, at the end of the …rst period, after observing both the action of the incumbent politician P 1 2 fV; Ig and its payo¤ u 1 2 f0; ug, the society optimally chooses whether to reelect him. Let (P 1 ; u 1 ) be the probability that the society that obtained u 1 attaches to a politician who invested in P 1 being congruent, and (P 1 ; u 1 ) be the probability that such a politician will be reelected. In the second period, the incumbent politician's choice only depends on his type (he will extract a rent if he is non-congruent, while he will implement the society's optimal policy if he is congruent), so the society's optimal reelection strategy is to reelect the incumbent politician if the probability (P 1 ; u 1 ) that the incumbent is congruent exceeds the a priori probability p that a new politician is congruent, i.e., if
The incumbent's choice generates one of the following three …rst-period records (P 1 ; u 1 ): (I; 0), (V; 0) or (V; u). When the society observes that the politician invested in the invisible public good, it cannot infer whether he extracted a rent (the e¤ects of rent extraction will indeed only be observed in the second period). On the contrary, when the society observes that the politician invested in the visible public good, it can infer whether he extracted a rent: if u 1 = 0, the politician extracted a rent, while if u 1 = u, he did not extract a rent.
The following lemma shows that when the incumbent's …rst-period record is (V; 0), in equilibrium the society does not reelect the incumbent politician.
Lemma 3.1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (V; 0) = 0, so (V; 0) = 0
The reason underlying the result in Lemma 3.1 is quite intuitive: only the noncongruent politician is interested in rents, so when (P 1 ; u 1 ) = (V; 0) the society knows that it is facing a non-congruent politician, and optimally chooses not to reelect him.
The following lemma identi…es four politician's dominated strategies: three of them are strictly dominated strategies (and so cannot be part of a PBE), while the fourth is only weakly dominated.
Lemma 3.2 In the …rst period, playing (I; N ) is a strictly dominated strategy for the non-congruent politician, while (V; R) is a weakly dominated strategy, whatever the values of r 1 and k 1 . In the …rst period, (I; R) and (V; R) are strictly dominated strategies for a congruent politician, whatever the values of r 1 and k 1 .
The …rst result of Lemma 3.2 obtains immediately from assumption A.1 and from the fact that the society does not observe a politician extracting rents. If a non-congruent politician plays (I; R) instead of (I; N ), he has the same probability of being reelected, but he also extracts a positive rent, so (I; R) is always better for him than (I; N ). The second result states the existence for a non-congruent politician of an endogenous bias towards the invisible public good I. This preference for the invisible public good as a device for extracting rents follows immediately from assumption A.2 and from Lemma 3.1. If a non-congruent politician played (V; R), his type would be revealed to the society, so he would be voted out of o¢ ce, while if he played (I; R), he might be reelected. The invisible public good generates the same utility from rents as the visible one, so (I; R) is always not worse then (V; R), and it may also be better. We will henceforth assume that the non-congruent politician will never play (V; R). Finally, the last two results states that the congruent politician never extracts a rent: by choosing either (V; N ) or (I; N ), he does not worsen his probability of being reelected (since (V; 0) = 0 from Lemma 3.1) and obtains a higher payo¤.
From Lemma 3.2, it follows that a congruent politician chooses in period 1 either (I; N ) or (V; N ), whereas from Lemma 3.2 and from the assumption that the noncongruent politician never plays his weakly dominated strategy (V; R), it follows that a non-congruent politician chooses either (I; R) or (V; N ). We let henceforth c k1 and n r1 be the probabilities that, respectively, a congruent politician who observed k 1 2 fH; Lg and a non-congruent politician who observed r 1 2 fh; lg play (V; N ) in the …rst period; with the complementary probability they will play, respectively, (I; N ) and (I; R). In the next subsection we characterize the PBE of the model with reelection.
Characterization of the equilibria
In order to characterize the PBE of the model with reelection, we …rst state two preliminary results.
Lemma 3.3 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (V; u) > (I; 0)
Investing in the invisible public good reduces the probability of being reelected because the non-congruent politician has an endogenous bias towards the invisible public good: he is only interested in rents and the invisible public good is a safer device to extract rents. The congruent politician who observed k 1 = L invests, in equilibrium, in the visible public good without extracting a rent: by so doing, he maximizes both social welfare and its probability of being reelected (since (V; u) > (I; 0)). On the other hand, both the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H and the noncongruent politician face a trade-o¤ between maximizing their payo¤ in that period and maximizing the probability of being reelected, so we cannot say a priori what they will play. This will depend on the strength of their reelection motives, which can be measured by the ratio between the higher utility they would obtain in the second period if they were reelected and the higher utility they obtain in the …rst period if they choose their dominant strategy in that period instead of investing in the visible public good. When this ratio is greater than one, we will say that the politician has 'strong reelection motives', while when it is smaller than one we will say that the politician has 'weak reelection motives'. The value of this ratio depends on the politician's type and, for a non-congruent politician, on the rent he is able to extract. Therefore, we will denote it as j , with j 2 fH; h; lg. Hence,
for a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H,
for a non-congruent politician who observed r 1 = h, and
for a non-congruent politician who observed r 1 = l, whereg
Generally, the politician's strategy depends on the society's strategy. However, the following proposition shows that this occurs only when a politician has strong reelection motives, while when he has weak reelection motives, he always plays its one-period dominant strategy.
Proposition 3.1 When a politician has weak reelection motives (i.e., j < 1), then he always plays his one-period dominant strategy, while when he has strong reelection motives (i.e., j > 1), then the strategy he plays depends on the society's strategy.
When a politician has weak reelection motives, he values staying in o¢ ce in period 2 less than selecting his dominant strategy in period 1, so he always invests in the invisible public good (without extracting a rent if congruent, and extracting a rent if non-congruent). When a politician has strong reelection motives, he values staying in o¢ ce in period 2 more than selecting his dominant strategy in period 1, so he will invest in the visible public good without extracting a rent if the increase in the probability of being reelected from investing in V rather than in I is su¢ ciently high.
The following proposition summarizes some important results on the non-congruent politician's reelection motives.
Proposition 3.2 When r 1 = l, the non-congruent politician is more interested in being reelected (i.e., l > h ) and has strong reelection motives (i.e., l > 1). When r 1 = h, he has strong reelection motives (i.e., h > 1) if (and only if )
The non-congruent politician is more interested in being reelected when he can only obtain a low utility from extracting a rent in period 1. In this case, he always has strong reelection motives: the expected utility from extracting a rent in period 2 is indeed greater than the utility from extracting a rent in period 1. On the contrary, when he can obtain a high utility from extracting a rent in period 1, he will have strong reelection motive if (and only if) the ego-rent he earns from holding o¢ ce in period 2 is su¢ ciently high (i.e., E n > g h g). The politician's reelection motives are increasing in the ego-rent and decreasing in the higher utility he would obtain by choosing in period 1 his optimal action; for a congruent politician, they are also decreasing in the probability p that a new politician is congruent (a congruent politician is indeed interested in the policy that will be implemented in period 2 even if he will not be reelected).
For convenience of exposition, we let p H be the share of congruent politicians such that H = 1, i.e.,
p h the share of congruent politicians such that H = h , i.e.,
and p l the share of congruent politicians such that H = l , i.e.,
When p = p H , a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H is indi¤erent between investing in the more fruitful invisible public good and being replaced in the following period by a (possibly non-congruent) new politician and investing in the less fruitful visible public good and being reelected with probability one. When p = p r1 , the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H and the non-congruent politician who observed r 1 2 fh; lg are equally interested in being reelected.
The following two propositions summarize some important results on the congruent politician's reelection motives.
Proposition 3.3 When k 1 = H, the congruent politician has strong reelection motives (i.e., H > 1) if (and only if ) one of the following two mutually exclusive sets of parametric restrictions is satis…ed:
If the ego-rent E c that a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H obtains from holding o¢ ce in period 2 is greater than the higher utility u H u he obtains from investing in I in period 1, then he has strong reelection motives even if he knows that he will be replaced for sure by a congruent politician (i.e., p = 1). On the other hand, if E c + u is lower than u H u, then he has weak reelection motives even if he knows that he will be replaced for sure by a non-congruent politician (i.e., p = 0). Finally, in the intermediate case, the strength of his reelection motives (weak or strong) depends on the probability p that he will be replaced by another congruent politician: if this is likely (unlikely) to occur, then he has weak (strong) reelection motives.
Proposition 3.4 When k 1 = H, the congruent politician is more interested in being reelected than the non-congruent politician who observed r 1 2 fh; lg (i.e., H > r1 ) if (and only if ) one of the following two mutually exclusive sets of parametric restrictions is satis…ed:
The congruent politician who observed k 1 = H may be more or less interested in being reelected than a non-congruent politician. If the ego-rent E c that a congruent politician obtains from holding o¢ ce in period 2 is su¢ ciently high, then he is more interested in being reelected than a non-congruent politician even if he knows that he will be replaced for sure by a congruent politician (i.e., p = 1), while if E c + u is su¢ ciently low, then he is less interested in being reelected than a non-congruent politician even if he knows that he will be replaced for sure by a non-congruent politician (i.e., p = 0). In the intermediate case, it depends on the probability p that he will be replaced by another congruent politician: if this is likely (unlikely) to occur, then he will be less (more) interested in being reelected than a non-congruent politician.
The following proposition states a general ine¢ ciency result: if the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H has strong reelection motives, then he may …nd it optimal to invest in the visible public good V instead of investing in the invisible public good I. When a congruent politician invests with positive probability in V and k 1 = H (i.e., c H > 0), we will speak of short-termism.
Proposition 3.5 If the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H has strong reelection motives (i.e., H > 1) and (V; u)
, then he will play (V; N ) instead of (I; N ) (i.e., c H = 1).
By de…nition, a congruent politician who has strong reelection motives values staying in o¢ ce in period 2 more than selecting his dominant strategy in period 1. Hence, if the increase in the probability of being reelected from playing (V; N ) rather than (I; N ) is su¢ ciently high, then he will invest in V .
While PROP. 3.5 provides a general ine¢ ciency result, it does not establish that equilibrium will display short-termism. The following de…nition describes the six types of PBE of the model with reelection. We will provide the conditions that give rise to each of them later on. The existence of equilibria E2, E3, and E6 is the …rst result of this paper. In all these equilibria, there is short-termism: in order to improve his reelection chances, the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H invests with positive probability in the visible public good V instead of investing in the invisible public good I.
It is also worth emphasizing that the society's beliefs may depend on the parameters and . Consider for instance, equilibrium E1. Given the equilibrium strategies of the two types of politicians, the society's belief that the incumbent politician is congruent when it observes (I; 0) is
which is actually less than p (which is required for (I; 0) = 0) if (and only if) > 6 . Hence, if < , then (I; 0) > p, so (I; 0) = 1 and equilibrium E1 cannot exist. With a similar reasoning, one obtains that < is a necessary condition also for the existence of equilibria E4 and E6, while > is a necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium E5. According to the traditional literature, elections may have two positive e¤ects: a disciplining and a selection e¤ect. The former is the ability of elections to induce a (non-congruent) politician to act in the public interest, while the latter is the possibility for the society to replace the incumbent politician with a better politician. In our model, there is always a disciplining e¤ect of reelection (n l > 0 in all the equilibria, while n h > 0 only in equilibria E3 and E5; such an e¤ect is maximum in equilibrium E3 and minimum in equilibrium E4), whereas there is selection e¤ect only in equilibria E1 and E2.
It is now worth pointing out some mathematical relations between the cut-o¤ values p l , p h and p H that will be useful for understanding the set of all possible equilibria of the model with reelection.
6 We can rule out the case in which (I; 0) = p because it calls for = , with occurs with probability zero.
Finally, p h > p l .
PROPP. 7.1 and 7.2 in the Mathematical Appendix provide the formal and complete characterization of the PBE of the model with reelection. Here, we present a …gure illustrating all the equilibria of the game for the case where p H < 1 and
The PBE of the model with reelection If, however, one takes into account that p H , p l , and p h may be either less than 0 or higher than 1 and are all increasing in E c , he can use Fig. 3 .1 to determine all the equilibria of the game. Consider for example the case where E n < g h g and p H < 0: we have to move down the two horizontal lines in Fig. 3 .1a till they disappear, so the PBE of the game for all p is E1 if < and E4 if > . In a similar manner, one can …nd the equilibria for all the other cases. Fig. 3 .1 shows that the equilibrium may actually be characterized by shorttermism (equilibria E2, E3, and E6, see DEF 3.1). But when does short-termism occur in equilibrium? From Lemma 3.3, an incumbent politician will be reelected, in equilibrium, with a higher probability if he invests in V rather than in I. One would therefore expect that if the ego-rent E c a congruent politician will earn from holding o¢ ce in the second period is high enough, he will invest in the visible public good even when k 1 = H, so short-termism will occur in equilibrium. This simple intuition is con…rmed by the following proposition that shows not only the existence of a PBE involving short-termism when E c is su¢ ciently high, but also that this is the unique equilibrium of the game. Proposition 3.7 If E c > u H u l , then the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game displays short-termism for all p, , and . This equilibrium is:
When E c > u H u l , for all p, the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H is more interested in being reelected than a non-congruent politician, so p l > 1. From Fig. 3 .1 one immediately obtains the result in PROP. 3.7. The horizontal lines move up as E c increases, and disappear when p l > 1. Hence, the (unique) PBE of the game is E2 if E n < g h g and E3 if E n > g h g.
In our model, the congruent politician wishes to hold o¢ ce not only to earn an ego-rent, but also to prevent a non-congruent politician from being elected (such a politician would indeed extract a rent, while the incumbent congruent politician would maximize social welfare). We have seen above that, if the ego-rent he expects to earn in the second period is su¢ ciently high, he will invest in V even if he knows for sure that he will be replaced by a congruent politician. In this case, the probability p that a politician is congruent does not a¤ect the equilibrium behavior of a congruent politician. As the ego-rent becomes less important, the equilibrium behavior of a congruent politician should instead depend on p, and it should be less likely that short-termism occurs in equilibrium. The following proposition shows when this is actually the case. u , then p H 2 (0; 1), so the congruent politician has strong reelection motives if (and only if) p < p H . As Fig. 3.1a shows, if the risk for a congruent politician that he will be replaced by a non-congruent politician is low enough, i.e., p > p H , then equilibrium does not involve shorttermism, while when p < p H , there exists a PBE displaying short-termism, albeit now it may no longer be the unique equilibrium of the game.
Finally, when the congruent politician does not derive any ego-rent from holding o¢ ce, he has exactly the same preferences as the society, and so he will always act in its interest. In this case, the unique reason why a congruent politician could be interested in being reelected is to prevent a non-congruent politician from being elected. If such an event is judged to be unlikely to occur (i.e., p is high), then there is no reason for a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H to provide the visible public good (it is indeed very likely that he will be replaced by another congruent politician who will maximize social welfare); so equilibrium does not involve shorttermism. The lack of a private bene…t for a congruent politician does not rule out, however, the possibility that there exists a PBE displaying short-termism. Indeed, as p decreases, the congruent politician becomes more interested in reelection, and so also his incentive to invest in V increases. If the loss from not investing in I is not too high, he could prefer investing in V if the risk of having in o¢ ce a noncongruent politician is high. The following proposition con…rms that the …rst result of this paper, namely the existence of equilibria in which there is short-termism, also obtains when the congruent politician has exactly the same preferences as the society.
Proposition 3.9 If E c = 0 and u H < 2u, then there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium involving short-termism if (and only if ) p < p H .
When E c = 0, the maximum gain a congruent politician may expect from holding o¢ ce in the second period is u. Hence, if the cost u H u from not investing in I when k 1 = H is smaller than u, and it is su¢ ciently likely that he will be replaced by a non-congruent politician (i.e., p < p H ), then there exists a PBE displaying short-termism. Otherwise, he has weak reelection motives and, from PROP. 3.1, he always provides the optimal public good in that period; so there exists no PBE displaying short-termism.
While it seems intuitive that a congruent politician who obtains an ego-rent from holding o¢ ce may invest in the visible public good when the invisible public good would be (socially) optimal in that period, the result in PROP. 3.9 seems somehow surprising. Indeed, a congruent politician with exactly the same preferences as the society always maximizes social welfare. This means that when E c = 0, shorttermism may somehow be 'optimal' for the society 7 . In the next subsection, we consider some cases where the society has the possibility to choose between an equilibrium with short-termism and one without short-termism. We show that short-termism may have some positive e¤ects on social welfare and may be actually optimal for the society (even when E c > 0).
The positive e¤ects of short-termism
Political short-termism is generally considered to have a negative e¤ect on social welfare. In this section, however, we will show that it may also have some positive e¤ects on social welfare, and it can even be optimal for the society. This is the second main result of the paper. The endogenous bias towards the invisible public good for the non-congruent politician implies that an incumbent politician will be reelected in equilibrium with a higher probability if he chooses V instead of I ( (V; u) > (I; 0), from Lemma 3.3). When a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H invests in V , it is therefore more likely that he will be reelected, so the probability that the o¢ ce will be held in the second period by a congruent politician increases. We will refer to this positive e¤ect as the selection e¤ ect of short-termism.
In order to show that such a positive e¤ect can make short-termism optimal for the society, we focus on the case where E n < g h g and < . From Fig. 3 .1a, the (unique) equilibrium of the game is: E1 if p > p H and E2 if p < p H . These two PBE only di¤er in the probability c H that a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H provides the visible public good: c H = 0 in equilibrium E1, and c H = 1 in equilibrium E2 (see DEF. 3.1). Hence, in this particular case, it is meaningful to ask whether the society prefers c H = 1 (equilibrium E2) or c H = 0 (equilibrium E1). The following proposition shows that the society prefers short-temism when p is su¢ ciently low. Proposition 3.10 Let E n < g h g and < . When u H < 2u, then short-termism is optimal for the society if (and only if ) p < 2 u u H .
In both equilibria E1 and E2, the society optimally reelects the incumbent politician if (and only if) he chose (V; N ). Given this optimal strategy, if a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H chooses c H = 0, then the expected utility for the society is u H + pu whereas if he chooses c H = 1, it is 2u
Thus, the society prefers that a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H chooses c H = 1 if (and only if)
Put it in another way, if p < p S , then the cost u H u for the society due to the fact that a congruent incumbent politician does not invest in I when k 1 = H is smaller than the expected bene…t u pu of maintaining a congruent incumbent politician in o¢ ce in period 2. Hence, in a world in which a high fraction of candidate politicians are non-congruent, and so there is not much con…dence in politicians, the society would prefer a congruent incumbent politician to send a good signal of congruence by investing in the visible public good V , so that he will be reelected and also hold o¢ ce in period 2. We can therefore conclude that in the case under consideration if the fear of having a non-congruent politician in the second period is high and the cost of not implementing the optimal policy I is low, then shorttermism is optimal for the society.
When E c = 0, the congruent politician has exactly the same preferences as the society, so p H = p S . In this case, when there exists short-termism, this is always optimal for the society (see PROP. 3.9). On the other hand, when E c > 0, then p H > p S , so short-termism can also obtain when this is not optimal for the society. This is illustrated by the following …gure. In the white area of Fig. 3 .2 a congruent politician acts in the society's interest, while in the grey area he invests in V when the society would prefer he invested in I. When E c = 0, the congruent politician always acts in the society's interest.
In the case under consideration, the congruent politician's strategy does not affect the equilibrium strategy of the society, which chooses to reelect an incumbent politician only if he invested in V even when the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H invests in I (i.e., when c H = 0). In other cases, however, if the congruent politician provides V instead of I, the society reelects an incumbent politician who invested in V with a higher probability ( (V; u) increases) and an incumbent politician who invested in I with a lower probability ( (I; 0) decreases). This gives the non-congruent politician a stronger incentive to invest in the visible public good without extracting a rent in order to be reelected, which is good for the society. We will refer to this positive e¤ect as the disciplining e¤ ect of short-termism. From both Fig. 3 .1 and DEF. 3.1, we can see that when there are multiple PBE, in the equilibria displaying short-termism the non-congruent politician plays (V; N ) with a higher probability 8 .
In order to show that such a positive e¤ect can make short-termism optimal for the society, we consider now all cases where there are multiple PBE and, for each of them, we rank the equilibria using the Pareto criterion. The following proposition shows that, if the probability p of having a congruent politician in o¢ ce in the second period is low enough, then the Pareto-optimal equilibrium displays short-termism. The economic reason underlying PROP. 3.11 is the following. When it is unlikely that a politician is congruent, the (negative) impact of the short-termism as well as the (positive) impact of the selection e¤ect on social welfare are both negligible. On the contrary, the (positive) impact of disciplining e¤ect on social welfare is relevant (it is indeed likely that the incumbent politician is non-congruent). The society therefore prefers the situation where the disciplining e¤ect on the non-congruent politician is maximum. As we saw above, this situation is the one displaying shorttermism.
In the next section, we show that reelection can actually reduce social welfare.
The negative e¤ect of reelection
In this section, we compare social welfare in the models with no reelection concern (N ) and with reelection concern (R). The third main result of the paper is that reelection can reduce social welfare. In our model, reelection can have two positive e¤ects (disciplining and selection e¤ects) and a negative e¤ect (the short-termism). In equilibria E1, E4, and E5, there are only positive e¤ects, so R N . In equilibria E2, E3, and E6, there is also short-termism, so it is not clear a priori whether R N or N R. The following proposition shows that the expected gain for the society from both the disciplining and the selection e¤ect may be more than o¤set by the expected loss due to short-termism. We henceforth focus on the case where there exists a unique PBE of the game, and such an equilibrium displays short-termism for all values of p, , and . This calls for E c > u H u l , and the PBE is:
As an obvious consequence, the following proposition does not exhaust all the cases where N R 9 .
In a model without reelection, the congruent politician maximizes social welfare, while the non-congruent politician extracts a rent. In a model with reelection (and equilibrium with short-termism), the former does not maximize social welfare when k 1 = H, but the latter invests with positive probability in the visible public good without extracting a rent (at least when he observed r 1 = l (see DEF. 3.1)). Hence, reelection is good for the society when the probability p is su¢ ciently low (disciplining e¤ect of reelection high, negative e¤ect of short-termism low).
The comparison between R and N also depends on the probability that the optimal public good is I (the maximum p such that R strictly dominates N indeed depends on ). When is su¢ ciently low, R strictly dominates N . The reason is that when it is unlikely that the invisible public good is the socially optimal public good in period 1 (i.e., k 1 = H), then it is also unlikely that the congruent politician invests suboptimally in the visible public good. The following …gure illustrates the comparison between R and N when E n < g h g (case (a)) and when Fig. 4 .1: The negative e¤ect of reelection So far, we have implicitly assumed that it is actually optimal for the society to delegate decisional power to a politician. However, the society could also make decisions itself, for example, through a referendum. In the next section we show that delegation can actually be optimal for the society.
Direct democracy versus delegation
In this section, we compare social welfare in N and R with social welfare in a model in which decisions are made directly by the society (direct democracy D), and show that delegating decisions to a politician may actually be optimal for the society. As in Maskin and Tirole (2004) , we de…ne the action which would be chosen if the society chose itself the popular action, i.e., the action that maximizes the society's per-period expected utility.
The per-period expected utilities for the society when it invests in the invisible (I) and in the visible (V ) public good are, respectively
If >^ , the popular action is I, while if <^ the popular action is V (when =^ the society is indi¤erent between investing in V or in I). We now analyze the society's choice to leave its decision to a politician. In our model, the unique reason why the society should delegate decisions to a politician is that he has an informational advantage: he know the optimal policy for the society. However, the society does not observe the politician's type. If it selects a congruent politician and he provides the (socially) optimal public good, then it will obtain a greater utility than the one it would have obtained should it had chosen the popular action. This is the advantage of delegation. However, if it selects a non-congruent politician, such politician will extract a rent (at least in the second period) and never invest in the invisible public good without extracting a rent (see Lemma 3.2), so the society obtains a smaller utility than the one it would have obtained should it had chosen the popular action. This is the disadvantage of delegation. One therefore expects that delegation is optimal when the probability that the selected politician is congruent is su¢ ciently high. The following two propositions compare social welfare in models D, N , and R and con…rm that if p is high enough, then delegation is optimal for the society: when in the model with reelection there is short-termism, N dominates both D and R (PROP. 5.1), while when there is not, R dominates both D and N (PROP. 5.2).
We …rstly focus on the case where there exists a unique PBE of the game, and such an equilibrium displays short-termism for all values of p, , and . This calls for E c > u H u l . When the congruent politician always invests in the visible public good, the society gains nothing by delegating the decision to a congruent politician, while it loses by delegating the decision to a non-congruent politician, so R is strictly dominated by D. Hence, only D and N can be optimal.
We now focus on a case where the game has a unique PBE, and such an equilibrium does not display short-termism for all p. Speci…cally, we consider the case where E c < u H 2u, so that p H < 0, and > . From Fig. 3 .1, the unique PBE of the game is E4 (p H < 0). When there exists no short-termism, in both models R and N the congruent politician maximizes social welfare, but in R the non-congruent politician acts better because of the disciplining e¤ect of elections, so R strictly dominates N . Hence, only D and R can be optimal. 
Figure 5.1: Delegation may be optimal Delegation (N or R) is optimal when the probability that a politician is congruent exceeds a threshold. Such a threshold is maximum (it tends to one) when tends to either 0 or 1 (the society almost knows for sure what is the optimal policy) and it is minimum when =^ (the society has no information on which is the optimal policy).
Conclusion
This paper concerns with political short-termism and electoral accountability. It tries to give an answer to the following question: May reelection concern give rise to political short-termism in a world in which voters are rational ? We …nd that this can indeed be the case when politicians di¤er in their motivation and are better informed than the citizens. Investing in long-term public goods reduces the probability of being reelected because bad politicians have an endogenous bias towards long-term public goods (they are only interested in rents and long-term public goods are a safer device to extract rents because the e¤ects of rent extraction will be observed only in the future). As a consequence, if a good politician is su¢ ciently interested in being reelected, then he will provide short-term public goods even when long-term public goods would be socially optimal. This can occur also when good politicians have exactly the same preferences as the society. Reelection concern may therefore reduce social welfare because of the undisciplining e¤ect on the good politicians.
Political short-termism is generally considered to have a negative e¤ect on social welfare. We …nd, quite surprisingly, that this need not be true, because it also has two positive e¤ects: when a good politician invests in short-term public goods, a congruent politician will be reelected with a higher probability, so it is less likely that in the future the o¢ ce will be held by a bad politician (selection e¤ ect); moreover, the society reelects an incumbent politician who invested in short-term public goods with a higher probability, so a bad politician has a stronger incentive to invest in short-term public goods without extracting a rent in order to be reelected (disciplining e¤ ect). We show that when it is su¢ ciently likely that a politician is non-congruent, then the society may prefer a situation in which there is short-termism.
7 Mathematical Appendix PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1. Suppose that the society observes (V; 0) and, for the moment, " = 0. Assume that (V; R) is played in equilibrium with positive probability. In a PBE, the society's beliefs (V; 0) must therefore be consistent with Bayes' Rule. We show that, in equilibrium, cannot be (V; 0) > 0. Assume …rstly that (V; 0) 2 (0; p). This calls for prob [(V; 0) jC ] > 0 (7.1) (V; 0) 2 (0; p) implies that (V; 0) = 0. Given this society's strategy, the congruent politician never plays (V; R): by choosing (V; N ), he does not worsen his probability of being reelected and obtains a higher utility. Hence, prob [(V; 0) jC ] = 0 and EQ. 7.1 does not hold. Assume secondly that (V; 0) 2 (p; 1]. This implies that (V; 0) = 1. The noncongruent politician plays either (V; R) or (I; R): by choosing (V; N ) or (I; N ) he does not increase his probability of being reelected and obtains a lower utility.
Since the non-congruent politician plays either (V; R) or (I; R), then
EQ. 7.3 implies that (I; 0) < p, and (I; 0) = 0. Hence, the non-congruent politician always plays (V; R), so prob [(V; 0) jN ] = 1 and EQ. 7.2 does not hold. Assume …nally that (V; 0) = p. If " > 0, then (V; 0) < p 10 , so (V; 0) = 0. This implies that (V; 0) = 0. Assume now that (V; R) is not played in equilibrium with positive probability. If " > 0, then only a non-congruent politician plays (V; R) (see note 10), so (V; 0) = 0.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3. We …rstly show that there cannot exist an equilibrium in which the probability of being reelected does not depend on the incumbent politician's …rst-period choice ( (I; 0) = (V; u)). If the incumbent politician could not in ‡uence the probability of being reelected, he would act as in the model without reelection concerns, so, from PROP. 2.1, in the …rst period a congruent politician would choose the optimal action for the society, whereas, from 1 0 When " > 0, there exists a fraction of politicians that are not interested in reelection, so that, in the …rst period, they choose actions according to their true preferences. A congruent politician chooses (V; N ) if he observed k 1 = L and (I; N ) if he observed k 1 = H, while the non-congruent politician always extracts a rent. By assumption A.2, it follows that the non-congruent politician is indi¤erent between choosing (V; R) and (I; R), so from assumption in note 1, he plays (V; R) with positive probability. As a consequence, when " > 0, the non-congruent politician plays (V; R) with a higher probability than a congruent politician, so (V; 0) < p.
Lemma 3.2, a non-congruent politician would always extract a rent by investing in the invisible public good I. Given these optimal strategies, from Bayes rule, the society's belief that the incumbent is congruent when (I; 0) is observed should be
Hence, it would not be optimal for the society to reelect an incumbent who invested in I, i.e., (I; 0) = 0. On the other hand, if it observed (V; u), its belief would be (V; u) = 1 > p so, it would be optimal for the society to reelect an incumbent politician who invested in V , i.e., (I; 0) = 0. But then (V; u) > (I; 0), which contrasts the assumption that (V; u) = (I; 0). We now show that there are no PBE such that (I; 0) > (V; u). When (I; 0) > (V; u), the non-congruent politician always plays (I; R), while the congruent one who observed k 1 = H plays (I; N ). The congruent politician who observed k 1 = L will face the following dilemma: if he plays (V; N ), it maximizes his utility in that period, but also decreases his probability of being reelected. Suppose …rstly that he plays (V; N ) with positive probability. This situation is not a PBE. Indeed, from Bayes rule, (V; u) = 1 > p, so (V; u) = 1 (I; 0), which contradicts the assumption (I; 0) > (V; u). Suppose now he plays (I; N ) with probability 1. From Bayes rule, (I; 0) = p, so any (I; 0) 2 [0; 1] is actually optimal. This situation is not a PBE, because it is not robust to the small perturbation of the pool of the candidate politicians introduced in section 2. Speci…cally, for any " > 0, only a congruent politician who observed k 1 = L invests in the visible public good without extracting a rent (see note 10), so the society's belief should be (V; u) = 1 > p Hence, (V; u) = 1 (I; 0), which contrasts the assumption that (I; 0) > (V; u).
PROOF OF PROP. 3.5.
Let H [(P 1 ; R 1 ) ; (P 1 ; u 1 )] be the per-period expected utility of a congruent incumbent politician who observed k 1 = H, when he chooses (P 1 ; R 1 ) 2 f(V; N ) ; (I; N )g, given the society's reelection strategy (P 1 ; u 1 ). Thus, when EQ. 7.6 is satis…ed, which calls for H > 1, then (V; N ) is the optimal choice for a congruent politician who observed k 1 = H. PROOF OF PROPP. 7.1 and 7.2. The …rst step of the proof calls for obtaining the society's optimal reelection strategy (P 1 ; u 1 ) 2 f(V; u) ; (I; 0)g, given the strategies of the four types of politicians. From
we have that
In a PBE, each type of politician plays a best response to the society's reelection strategy (P 1 ; u 1 ) 2 f(V; u) ; (I; 0)g. The second step of the proof calls therefore for obtaining the politicians'best response correspondences. From EQQ. 7.4 and 7.5 12 , we have that The …nal step of the proof works as follows. For each reelection strategy (P 1 ; u 1 ) 2 f(V; u) ; (I; 0)g, using EQQ 7.8 and 7.9, we compute the optimal action to be implemented by the four types of politicians; then we use EQ 7.7 to check whether the assumed reelection strategy is actually optimal. With this procedure, we compute all the PBE of the game. Recall …rstly that when (I; 0) (V; u), from Lemma. 3.3, there are no PBE; moreover, from Lemma. 3.4, in a PBE, c L = 1. Let now (I; 0) = 0 and (V; u) = 1. From EQQ. 7.8, n l = 1. For c H and n h , we have to consider several cases. Note …rstly that we can rule out the cases in which a type (or both) of politician randomizes, because it calls for equations of only parameters, which occur with probability zero. For example, if the non-congruent politician who observed r 1 = h randomizes, from EQ. 7.9, then it must be
The remaining cases are the following: (i) if c H = 0 and n h = 1, from EQ. 7.7, (I; 0) = 0 and (V; u) = 1 is not actually optimal, and so it is not a PBE. (ii) if c H = 0 and n h = 0, from EQ. 7.7, (I; 0) = 0 and (V; u) = 1 is actually optimal if (and only if) > (Equilibrium E1). The conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are 13 : 8 > > > < > > > :
and n h = 0, from EQ. 7.7, (I; 0) = 0 and (V; u) = 1 is actually optimal (Equilibrium E2).
The conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are: 8 > <
> :
(7.11) (iv) if c H = 1 and n h = 1, from EQ. 7.7, (I; 0) = 0 and (V; u) = 1 is actually optimal (Equilibrium E3). The conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are: 8 > <
Let now consider (I; 0) < (V; u), with (I; 0) 2 (0; 1) or (V; u) 2 (0; 1) (or both). For c H , n l , and n h , we have to consider several cases. First of all, note that there are no PBE in which all the types of politicians randomize. It follows immediately from the fact that when non-congruent politician who observed r 1 = h randomizes, a non-congruent one who observed r 1 = l optimally plays a pure strategy (and vice versa) (from PROP. 3.4, l > h ). Moreover, we can rule out the cases in which two types of politician simultaneously randomize, because they call for equations of only parameters, which occur with probability zero. For example, if both the congruent politician who observed k 1 = H and a non-congruent one who observed r 1 = h randomize, from EQQ. 7.8 and 7.9, then it must bẽ (vi) if (I; 0) 2 (V; u) Proposition 7.3 In the limit when " ! 0, in the pooling equilibrium in (V; N ), the incumbent politician will be reelected if (and only if ) he played (V; N ) PROOF OF PROP. 7.3. Assume " > 0. The society's belief that the politician who invested in the invisible public good being congruent is (I; 0) = p p + 1 p < p and so it does not reelect him ( (I; 0) = 0). By contrast, when it observes (V; u), the probability that the incumbent politician being non-congruent is 1 (V; u) = (1 p)(1 ") (1 ") + "p(1 ) < 1 p and so it reelects him ( (V; u) = 1).
